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Abstract
This paper develops a model of determination of unionized wage in the presence of both
collective bargaining and e¢ ciency wage. The e¢ ciency of each worker is positively related to
both the wage and the unemployment rate in the economy. The unionized wage is greater than
the e¢ ciency wage. The rm nds it protable to keep the unionized wage as close as possible
to the e¢ ciency wage. The union leader who is entrusted with the task of determining the
unionized wage charges a bribe from the rm to keep the wage close to this level. The corrupt
trade union leader and the management of the rm play a two-stage Nash bargaining game from
where equilibrium unionized wage and the bribe are determined. The analysis leads to some
interesting results which are important for anticorruption policy formulation.
Keywords: Corruption, Collective Bargaining, E¢ ciency Wage, Union, Firms
JEL Classication: D21, D73, J5, J51, O17
1 Introduction
Yano (2009) notes that high quality markets are indispensable for the healthy growth of a modern
economy. Many problems in emerging economies often arise due to the lack of high quality markets.
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Yano (2009) also observes that market quality is likely to be low if markets are characterized by
coercive sales, fraud and shoddy goods.1 In most emerging economies the phenomenon of coercive
power and fraud can be attributed, either directly or indirectly, to some form of political corruption.
Such a corruption is often responsible for poor quality of markets which results in signicant welfare
loss. In this paper we try to analyze a specic form of such political corruption that plagues the
working of markets in many emerging economies. In particular, we will analyze a scenario where a
corrupt leader of a labour union strikes a deal with the management of a rm.
Over the last few decades, corruption has become all-pervasive, especially in many developing
countries, and is widely believed to be the single most important obstacle to development. Wide-
spread corruption across organizations, both public and private, surely goes a long way in explaining
the poor performance of developing countries. Corruption can take di¤erent forms and can occur
on di¤erent scales. There is corruption that occurs as small favours between a small number of
people (petty corruption), corruption that critically a¤ects the government on a large scale (grand
corruption), and corruption which is so prevalent that it is a part of the every day structure of
society, including corruption as one of the symptoms of organized crime (systemic corruption).2
There is a huge literature on corruption.3 Below we review a few papers directly related to our
exercise.
Following Becker and Stigler (1974), many of the theoretical papers e.g. Baneld (1975), Rose-
Ackerman (1975, 1978) and Klitgaard (1988, 1991, 1998) focus on the principal-agent framework of
corruption. These models deal with the relationship between the principal, i.e. the top level of the
government (say, a minister) and the agent (an o¢ cial) who takes a bribe from private individuals
interested in some government-produced goods or services. These studies examine di¤erent ways
of controlling corruption. Cadot (1987) and Basu et al. (1992) analyze bribery in a model with a
hierarchical administration. In a very di¤erent context, Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1993) show how
corrupt practices in a socialist economies lead to reduction in production and welfare. Since the
planners (bureaucrats in the ministries and managers of rms) in such economies cannot keep the
o¢ cial prots that public sector rms earn, it is in their interest to create shortages of output and
1These may be thought of as reections of three primary factors that determine market quality. The primary
factors are, quality of competition, quality of information, and quality of products.
2Klitgaard (1998) postulates that corruption will occur if the corrupt gain is greater than the penalty multiplied
by the likelihood of being caught and prosecute.
3See Mishra (2005) for an excellent collection of some important papers related to corruption.
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to collect bribes from consumers. Chaudhuri and Dastidar (2014) has a similar approach as ours
but this paper does not consider the e¤ects of e¢ ciency wage.4
Contributions of this paper In the present paper we deal with a the e¤ects of the presence of
a corrupt union leader in a unionized industry, who strikes a deal with the management of a rm.
The presence of such forms of corruption often contributes to perpetuation of low wages among
skilled workers in the formal sector, especially in emerging economies. Such corrupt practices are
often observed in the functioning of the labour market in many developing economies. We develop
a model about determination of unionized wage in the presence of a corrupt union leader who acts
as an intermediary between workers and management of a rm.5
We consider two types of worker in our framework: skilled and unskilled. We assume that
production in the rm requires only skilled labour earning the level of wage W . The skilled labour
market is distorted due to e¢ ciency wage and collective bargaining. The e¢ ciency of each skilled
worker is positively related to both the wage, W , and the unemployment rate, U , in the economy.
U refers to the skilled unemployment rate. The unskilled workers are all in the informal sector.
The labour market in the informal sector is perfectly competitive (i.e. free of e¢ ciency wage and
collective bargaining) so that it provides employment to all unskilled workers at the market clearing
unskilled wage, W . 6.
Subsequently, if not otherwise stated, by worker of the rm in our model we mean skilled worker.
Similarly, if not otherwise stated, in the case of the informal sector, by worker we mean unskilled
worker.
As noted earlier, the e¢ ciency of a skilled worker is positively related to both the wage and
unemployment rate in the economy. In the absence of collective bargaining, up to a certain level
of wage (e¢ ciency wage), the rms prot and the wage rate are positively related and the prot
maximizing rm chooses the unit-cost minimizing wage. However, in the presence of collective
4As per the theory of e¢ ciency wage the e¢ ciency of a worker is positively related to both the wage and
unemployment rate in the economy.
5 In many industrial sectors in India, corrupt deals between the union leader and the management are common
and are often reported in newspapers.
6So, there is no unemployment of unskilled labour in the economy. This scenario is common in a country like
India. Typically, the unskilled workers ock to the informal sector and earn a comeptitive wage. The skilled workers,
on the other hand, operate mainly in the formal sector where formal labour laws are applicable. The formal sector
is characterised by unemployment.
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bargaining, the unionized wage is higher than the e¢ ciency wage and the protability of the rm
and the wage rate are negatively correlated. In this scenario, the management of the rm nds it
protable to negotiate with the union leader so as to keep the unionized wage as close as possible to
the e¢ ciency wage. This gives the union leader an opportunity to charge a bribe from the rm for
keeping the unionized close to that desired level. The workers of the rm are unsure about whether
a shady deal has been struck between the two parties (the management and the union leader).
However, the workers are watchful and can smell a rat if the wage is set too low and consequently,
there is a risk associated with bribe-taking. The lower the wage agreed upon by the two parties
(management and the union leader), the higher would be the probability that the bribery on the
part of the leader would be detected by the union members. If the union leader is detected as
having resorted to bribe taking, he will be removed from his post and will have no other option
but to seek employment in the informal sector o¤ering a low competitive wage, W .
As this corrupt practice (negotiation on a bribe to keep the wage low) is mutually benecial to
both the parties, the management of the rm and the union leader play a cooperative game. To
model such a scenario, we consider a two-stage game. In the rst stage the union leader and the
management play a Nash bargaining game where the two players jointly determine the unionized
wage and the bribe. In the second stage the rm decides on the number of workers to be employed.
We compute the equilibrium levels of employment, unionized wage and the bribe. Thereafter, we
conduct some comparative static exercises.
The analysis leads to some interesting results. (i) An increase in the price of the nal output or
an increase in the economy-wide unemployment rate lead to increases in both the unionized wage
and bribe. However, there is a reduction in the equilibrium level of employment. (ii) Similar e¤ects
are observed when there is an increase in the reservation income of the leader or a decrease in the
xed cost of the rm. (iii) Policies that raise the informal sector wage lead to reduction in both the
unionized wage and bribe and an increase in equilibrium employment. Thus we advocate policies
like strict implementation of the minimum wage law and employment guarantee programs for the
poorer section as such policies are likely to raise the informal sector wage.
2 The Model
Consider a scenario where there is a corrupt union leader who intermediates between the workers
and a rm in a unionized competitive industry. The reservation wage of the workers is W (informal
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sector wage). The union leader does all the bargaining with the rm as the sole representative of
the workers. He receives a bribe, Z, from the rm for keeping the wage, W , as close as possible to
W . Production depends on labour (L) and on the e¢ ciency of the worker, h (W;U), where U is
the unemployment rate in the economy. U is exogenously given. Following e¢ ciency wage theory
we assume that h (:) is increasing in W and increasing in U . That is, hW ; hU > 0. The reasons are
as follows. AsW rises, the workers morale increases that raises his e¢ ciency. If the unemployment
rate, U , rises, the worker feels that he is lucky enough to be employed. Hence, with an increase
in U , the worker values his job more and this raises his e¢ ciency. Alternatively, an increase in U
means that the probability that any worker will be red (if found shirking) increases.7 This means
that in case of rising U a typical worker will put in more e¤ort in order to lower the probability of
getting red.8
Wemodel the production function in the following way. Let g (W;U;L) = h(W;U)L. Production
function is given by Q = Q(g). Note that we consider this formulation as we take labour as the
only input. Although, L (number of workers in physical unit) is determined separately, h(:) is
determined when a decision on W is made (U is given exogenously). Essentially, a rm determines
the quantity of labour input (in e¢ ciency unit), g (:) = h(:)L, to employ so as to maximize the prot.
We assume Q0 > 0 and Q00 < 0. This simply means that the marginal product of e¢ ciency unit,
g (:), is positive and this marginal product diminishes with increases in output. This assumption
is justied when the rm has a xed stock of physical capital.
We assume that there exists a  0 s.t. Q (g) > 0 for all g > a. This essentially means that
a critical minimum amount of labour input (in e¢ ciency units) is required to start production.
We also assume that that Q00 (g) g + Q0 (g)  0 for all g > a. Since Q00 < 0 this assumption will
hold true when the absolute value of Q00 (:) is high enough. This will be true when the production
function displays highly decreasing returns. In many poor economies this is likely to be the case
because of smaller scales of production and prevalence of outdated technology.9
7The employer has a better chance of nding a suitable replacement (possibly at a lower wage) for any sacked
worker as the number of unemployed men rises.
8The e¢ ciency function of labour is a simplied version of that available in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995).
Mathematical derivation of the e¢ ciency function from the rational behavior of a representative worker and explana-
tions of the mathematical restrictions on the partial derivatives are available in these works. For applications of this
type of e¢ ciency function in simple general equilibrium models one may look at Chaudhuri (2011) and Chaudhuri
and Banerjee (2010a, b).
9We now provide an example where both these assumptions hold true. Take Q (g) = A   g  where  > 0. Let
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The labour market facing the industry is unionized. Each rm in the industry has a separate
trade union. Such a scenario is very common in emerging economies. In such a framework we
analyze the equilibrium levels of unionized wage, W , employment L and bribe Z.
We model this as a simple two-stage game. In stage 1, the corrupt leader and the rm play
a Nash bargaining game and determine the unionized wage, W , and the amount of bribe, Z. In
stage 2, the rm takes W and Z as given and chooses the level of employment L.
2.1 Second Stage
The rm can sell any amount at price P . It essentially acts as a competitive rm in the output
market. This may be possible when the rm is an export oriented rm in a small open emerging
economy like India. Such a rm acts as a price-taker at the international market. It can sell as much
quantity as it wants in the world market at the internationally determined price. The unionized
wage, W , is paid out of realized sales proceeds. If L denotes the number of workers employed by
the rm its total wage cost is WL. Q (g (W;U;L)) is the amount of output produced. T is the xed
cost that the rm has to incur in its production and marketing processes. For example, if the rm
is an export oriented unit, typically it must undergo certain procedures e.g. obtaining an export
license, processing of shipping bill etc.10 All these bureaucratic processes are very time-consuming
and also involve lots of costs (including petty bribery at all levels). These costs are here captured
by T . Export-promotional measures are aimed at simplifying these procedural formalities and such
measures lower T .
Since g (W;U;L) = h (W;U)L we can write rms payo¤ as follows.
 = PQ (h(W;U)L) WL  Z   T      (1) :
Note thatW and Z are determined in the rst stage. Given this, the rm chooses L to maximize
. The rst and second order conditions are as follows.
@
@L
= PQ0 (h (W;U)L)h (W;U) W = 0     (2)
@2
@L2
= PQ00 (h (W;U)L) [h (W;U)]2 < 0     (3)
a =
 
1
A
 1
 . Note that Q (g) > 0 for all g > a. If A is high enough and  is small enough then a =
 
1
A
 1
 is very small
and so the restriction is not much. For example, if A = 10000 and  = 1
10
then a =
 
1
A
 1
 = 1
1000010
= 1:0  10 40
which is almost zero. Here Q0 = g  1 and Q00 =   (+ 1) g  2. Note that gQ00 +Q0 =  2g  1 < 0.
10For the details of such export procedure in a country like India see
<<http://business.gov.in/taxation/export_procedure.php>>
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Since Q00 (:) < 0 the second order condition (3) is always satised. From (2) we get the prot
maximizing amount of employment. We denote it by L (W;P; r; U). We assume that L is such
that g = h (W;U)L > a. This ensures a non-trivial equilibrium where Q (g) > 0. Routine
computations yield the following.11
LW < 0; L

P > 0 and L

U  0:     (4)
L is decreasing in W , increasing in P and non-increasing in U .
Let Y denote the reservation income of the union leader (say from directly joining politics). Let
W denote the wage rate prevailing in the informal sector of the economy. It may be noted that any
changes in the parameters of the system a¤ect L both directly and indirectly (through changes in
the formal sector wage rate, W ). In (4) we capture only the direct e¤ects.12
Let  denote the prot of the rm when L = L and is given by
 = PQ (h (W;U)L) WL   Z   T      (5)
Using the envelope theorem from (5) the following results can be easily derived.13
W ; Z ; T < 0; P ; U > 0 and Y ;W = 0     (6)
We now proceed to solve the rst stage of the game.
2.2 First Stage
In the rst stage the rm and the corrupt union leader play a cooperative game and determine
W and Z jointly through a Nash Bargaining process. Let p (W ) be the probability that the union
leader will be detected by other workers for his unethical practice and be removed from his post14.
Note that W  W . We assume the following.
p (:) : [W;1)  ! [0; 1]
p0 (W ) < 0; p00 (W )  0 and p (W ) = 1
11See Appendix 1 for the derivations.
12L independent of Z; Y ; T and W .
13See Appendix 1 for the computations. The result that W < 0 follows from (8a), (8b) and (12).
14Typically in emerging economies such as India, the workers (or a substantial fraction of them) revolts againts
such a leader and he is removed forcibly.
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If the leader (along with the rm) sets a wage equal to W , then the workers will clearly realize
that there has been a deal struck between the rm and the leader (with kickbacks being paid) and
in this case the leader will be removed from his post with certainty. If the chosen W is strictly
higher than W then the workers are not certain whether such a deal has taken place or not and
consequently the probability that the leader will be caught is less than one. Higher is the chosen
wage W , the lower will be the probability of getting caught since with higher wages the workers
become less suspicious. If the union leader is detected in resorting to bribe-taking, he will be
summarily removed from his post and will loose his formal sector job. Any political party in a
democratic set-up will think twice before including him in its organization because it may badly
a¤ect its image and harm its political prospects. In this case the union leader has to fall back upon
an informal sector job where the wage rate is W .15 The union leader is assumed to be risk-neutral
and his expected income is therefore given by
Y = (1  p (W )) (W + Z) + p (W )W =W + Z   p (W ) (W + Z  W ) :     (7)
From (7) the following may be noted.
YW =
@Y
@W
= 1  p0 (W ) (W + Z  W )  p (W ) > 0      (8a)
YZ =
@Y
@W
= 1  p (W ) > 0      (8b)
YW =
@Y
@W
= p (W ) > 0      (8c)
YP = YY = YU = YT = 0      (8d)
The rms payo¤ is  = PQ (h (W;u)L) WL Z. We assume that if the bargaining process
breaks down no production will take place and consequently the rms prot in this case would be
zero. As noted before, the union leader has a reservation income, Y . He will not be engaged in
union leadership unless Y  Y . The disagreement payo¤ vector is thus (Y ; 0).
2.2.1 The Nash Bargaining Solution
To arrive at the Nash Bargaining solution we maximize B = (Y   Y ) w.r.t W and Z.
15Even if he is able to gain entry in another smaller (and insignicant) party, having very little prospects of coming
to power, the ousted union leader is likely get an unimportant position in the new party with low payo¤s. This
scenario is common in a country like India.
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The rst order conditions are given as follows.
BW = YW + (Y   Y )W = 0     (9)
BZ = YZ + (Y   Y )Z = 0      (10)
The second order condition for maximization requires the determinant D to be negative denite
where
D =
 BWW BWZBZW BZZ

From the second order conditions it follows that
BWW ; BZZ < 0 and D = BWWBZZ   (BWZ)2 > 0     (11)
From equations (9) and (10) we get
W
Z
=
YW
YZ
     (12)
Let "h;W =

@h(:)
@W
W
h(:)

be the wage elasticity of the e¢ ciency of each worker.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the wage elasticity of the workers e¢ ciency function is less than
unity. That is, "h;W < 1.
Proof Given in Appendix 2.
Comment In the standard e¢ ciency wage model where the e¢ ciency of each worker is positively
related to both wage rate and unemployment rate and there is no collective bargaining the price-
taker rm is free to maximize its prot with respect to both wage and level of employment. It
chooses the wage that minimizes its unit cost of labour i.e.

W
h(:)

. This happens at the point
where the wage elasticity of the e¢ ciency function is exactly equal to unity.16 This is the standard
Solow condition in the e¢ ciency wage literature. Let this unit cost-minimizing wage beWe and this
is constant. Once We is determined the prot-maximizing rm then equates the value of marginal
product of labour to We for determining the number of workers to be employed in production.
However, in the presence of collective bargaining the optimal wage, say W , is greater than the
16See Basu (1998) and Chaudhuri (2011) in this context.
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e¢ ciency or unit-cost minimizing wage, We.17 Naturally, at W  the wage elasticity of the e¢ ciency
function would be less than unity. More interestingly, the algebraic value of this elasticity would
increase with a decrease in the bargaining power of the labour union resulting from the policy
of labour market reform. However, it is not visible in the present case as we have assumed the
bargaining powers of the two parties to be equal.
Solving equations (9) and (10) the equilibrium values of W and Z, denoted W  and Z, respec-
tively are obtained as functions of the parameters of the system, P , Y , U , T and W . In general
forms these are written as follows.
W  =W  (P; Y ; U; T;W ) and Z = Z (P; Y ; U; T;W )     (13)
3 The Main results
We now analyze the e¤ects of changes in P ,Y , U , T andW on the equilibrium levels of wage (W ),
bribe (Z) and employment (L). Although di¤erent parameters may change concurrently, to x
our ideas we consider their e¤ects one by one.
We will throughout assume that P (and hence ) to be su¢ ciently high and (Y   Y ) to be low.
We now provide some plausible reasons as to why P (and hence  ) could be high and (Y   Y )
could be low.
Remark 1 Consider the case where the rm is an export oriented unit. For example, in India
there are export promotion zones where rms primarily designed for exports operate. Such rms
often act as price takers in the export market. Such a rm typically receive a very high price (P )
for its product in the international market. If the income elasticity for such a product is very high
in the international market, then also P can be very high. Since such a rm operates in the formal
sector it can derive di¤erent benets that the government provides to exporting rms to boost
17Here each skilled worker has a reservation wageW , which is the unskilled informal sector wage. As there is skilled
unemployment in the economy, the skilled worker in our rm may not get a job and in that case he has to recourse to
an unskilled job in the informal sector because the latter sector is perfectly competitive and can absorb all workers
including unemployed skilled ones. So the reservation income constraint of each skilled worker in our rm is W W .
In the absence of any collective bargaining, and reservation wage constraint the rm is free to choose the e¢ ciency
wage, We . However, in the presence of the constraint the actual wage, Wa, must be Wa =Max fWe;Wg (see Basu
(1998)). However, in our paper because we have assumed P (and hence ) to be high and W to be low (see Remarks
1 and 2), We must be greater than W .
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exports.18 This reduces T which in turn can push up . On the other hand, if the rm produces
an import good, it is often protected by protectionist policies like an import tari¤. Even after trade
liberalization the tari¤ rate has remained quite high on many commodities across countries.19 The
domestic or tari¤ inclusive price of the good then can become very high which results in high .
Remark 2 Although in this model, there is only one union leader doing all the wage bargaining
with the rm, in real life often there are a number of labour unions a¢ liated to di¤erent political
parties and a quite a number of people in the race within each union. The race for the union
leadership in emerging economies is often for the appropriation of bribe from wage bargaining.
Competition among union leaders ultimately keeps Y as close to Y (payo¤ to the union leader from
directly joining politics and getting elected in any civic body). The more intense the competition
the smaller would be the gap between Y and Y . At the same time, the informal wage, W , in many
areas of a developing country like India is also very low and sometimes well below the minimum
wage as stipulated by the government. This is because the informal sector is completely unregulated
and the enforcement machinery in charge of implementing the minimum wage law is ine¢ cient and
often itself corrupt. This is another factor that may be responsible for both Y and (Y   Y ) to be
low. Furthermore, it may be noted that the reservation income, Y , is the income of the union leader
received from directly joining politics. This gure may in fact be quite high, which is presently the
case in India, so that the di¤erence, (Y   Y ) is likely to be su¢ ciently low.20
We now provide the main results of our exercise. The proofs appear in Appendix 2.
Proposition 2 W  increases following (i) an increase in P , (ii) an increase in U and (iii) an
increase in Y . On the other hand, W  decreases with (i) an increase in W and (ii) an increase in
T .
Proposition 3 Z increases following (i) an increase in P , (ii) an increase in U and (iii) an
increase in Y . On the other hand, Z decreases with (i) an increase in W and (ii) an increase in
T .
18Such export promotion policies are common in countries like India and China.
19For many essential food items (example, sugar) the tari¤ rate on imports are very high in countries like India.
Very recently India raised its import duty on sugar to 40 percent from 15 percent, to revive business at sugar mills .
20Anecdotal evidences from newspaper expose show that income from directly joining politics in India may indeed
be very high.
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Proposition 4 L decreases following (i) an increase in U and (ii) an increase in Y ; and, (iii) a
decrease in T . On the other hand, L increases with (i) an increase in W and (ii) an increase in
T . However, the e¤ect of an increase in P on L is ambiguous.
Comment We now provide the intuition behind the above propositions.
An increase in the product price, P , raises prot of the rm, , at a given level of output and
gives an opportunity to the union leader to reap a part of the benet and increase his expected
income, Y , by raising both bribe (Z) and the unionized wage (W ) . Note that Y is increasing in
both Z and W . So, the rm in the process cannot reap the entire benet of the price increase.
On the employment front, there are both direct and indirect (induced) e¤ects. As the rm equates
the value of marginal product of labour (VMPL) to wage it would hire more labour than before.
This is the direct e¤ect on L. On the other hand, the increase in W  raises the e¢ ciency of each
worker ( since hw > 0) and makes it possible to produce a higher level of output with the same
number of workers. However, as the wage elasticity of the workers e¢ ciency function is less than
unity in equilibrium due to presence of collective bargaining, diminishing marginal productivity of
labour ensures that the level of employment goes down as W  rises. This is the indirect e¤ect.
Hence, due to presence of two opposite forces, the net e¤ect of an increase in P on L is ambiguous.
An increase in the economy-wide unemployment rate (U) raises the e¢ ciency of each worker
(since hU > 0) which makes it possible for the rm to produce a higher (same) level of output with
the same (a lower) number of workers. This raises its protability given other things. However,
the union leader will grab this opportunity to increase his expected income by raising both Z and
W . This lowers the increased prot of the rm somewhat. The direct e¤ect on L would either
be negative or zero because in either of the two cases the protability of the rm rises.21 However,
the indirect e¤ect would be a decrease in employment as W  rises. Hence, the overall e¤ect on L
would be negative.
On the other hand, a reduction in xed cost (T ), arising from export-promotional measures,
raises the prot of the rm. The trade union leader again takes this opportunity to increase both
Z and W  to increase his expected income. A change in T does not have any direct e¤ect on
L. However, the equilibrium employment, L, falls due to induced e¤ect that works through the
increase in W .
21Note that LU  0. See Appendix 1 in this context.
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Then, if the reservation income of the union leader, Y , rises say due to an increase in the
return to directly joining politics, both  and Y would not initially be a¤ected although (Y   Y )
falls. However, as his opportunity income rises the union leader will be interested to remain in his
present post only if it becomes more rewarding than previously. This is possible only when both
Z and W  increase. Consequently, Y rises although  falls. The employment level of the rm,
L, unequivocally falls as W  rises.
Finally, if the informal sector wage, W , rises, at given W  and Z, the expected income of the
union leader (given by (7)) rises as YW > 0 (see (8)). The risk-neutral leader will nd it protable
to lower both W  and Z. Both the players would likely to be benetted in the process. The
equilibrium employment, L, also increases as W  has fallen.
4 Conclusion
Market quality is a measure for the e¢ ciency of allocation and the fairness of dealing and pric-
ing (Yano, 2009). Corruption severely a¤ects the fairness of dealing and pricing in markets and
consequently reduces the quality of markets.
Corruption takes di¤erent forms. In this paper we have analyzed corrupt practices in the labour
market in the presence of both e¢ ciency wage and collective bargaining. Here corrupt practices are
pursued by a trade union leader who is entrusted with the task of bargaining with the rm to decide
on the unionized wage in a competitive industry. The e¢ ciency of a worker is positively related
to both the wage and unemployment rate in the economy. In the absence of collective bargaining
a prot-maximizing rm chooses the unit-cost minimizing wage (e¢ ciency wage). However, in the
presence of collective bargaining the unionized wage is higher than the e¢ ciency wage so that the
protability of the rm and the wage rate are negatively associated. In this situation, the rm
nds it protable to negotiate with the union leader so as to keep the wage as close as possible
to the e¢ ciency wage. The union leader charges a bribe from the rm for keeping the unionized
wage close to the e¢ ciency wage level. There is a positive risk involved in bribe-taking. The lower
the wage the higher would be the possibility that the bribery on the part of the leader would be
detected by his union members and will be removed from his post. In that case the leader has to
accept a job in the informal sector o¤ering a low wage. The leader is risk-neutral. As this corrupt
practice is mutually benecial the rm and the union leader play a cooperative game.
We considered a two-stage Nash bargaining game. In the rst stage the two players jointly
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determine the unionized wage and bribe while in the second stage the rm decides on the level of
employment. We then went on to carry out some comparative statics and obtained a few interesting
results. For example, an improvement in the demand conditions in the international market for
the commodity resulting in an increase in product price or an economic recession culminating in a
higher unemployment rate in the economy or a higher number of nancial scams leading to a higher
expected return from joining direct politics or an export promotional scheme that lowers the xed
cost of the rm raises the equilibrium values of both unionized wage and bribe and consequently
lowers employment level chosen by the rm. Hence, in such cases not only the degree of corruption
(bribe money) rises but also the employment situation worsens. Both of these seriously a¤ect
market quality and social welfare.
Signicantly, our analysis also shows that policies that raise the informal sector wage would
be successful not only in bringing down the degree of corruption but also in increasing employ-
ment through reduction in the unionized wage. For example, strict implementation of the min-
imum wage act and policies like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Programme (MGNREGP), introduced in India in 2005, that signicantly increases the informal
wage can combat corruption, improve market fairness and the employment situation in emerging
economies.22
In short, our exercise provides a very simple framework for analyzing a particular form of
political corruption that a­ icts many emerging economies. Our analysis also shows a way for
designing appropriate policies to ght against corruption in trade union leadership.
22Several studies like Zimmermann (2012) and Berg et al. (2012) have found that informal wages have increased
signicantly since the inception of such schemes.
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Appendix 1
The production function that we have considered is
Q = Q (g) ; Q0 (g) > 0 and Q00 (g) < 0     (A1)
where g = hL and
h = h (W;L) ; hW ; hU > 0     (A2)
We dene " =

@Q0(:)
@g
g
Q0(:)

as the elasticity of the marginal product of labour (in e¢ ciency unit).
As the marginal product of labour is diminishing we have " < 0.
j"j  1()

Q00 (g) g
Q0 (g)
  1

() Q00 (g) g +Q0 (g)  0     (A3)
Since we have assumed that [Q00 (g) g +Q0 (g)]  0 (for g  a) we must have j"j  1 for g  a.
Totally di¤erentiating equation (2) we can easily derived the following results.
LW =
@L
@W =
1 PhW (:)[Q00(h(:)L)h(:)L+Q0(h(:)L)]
PQ00(h(:);L)[h(:)]2
< 0 if j"j  1
LP =
@L
@P =
 Q0(h(:);L)h(:)
PQ00(h(:);L)[h(:)]2
> 0
LU =
@L
@U =  PhU (:)[Q
00(h(:)L)h(:)L+Q0(h(:)L)]
PQ00(h(:);L)[h(:)]2
< (=) 0 i¤ j"j > (=) 1
LZ = LY = LT = LW = 0
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
     (A4)
Now using proposition 1 and (A.2) and applying the envelope theorem from equation (5) we can
derive the following expressions.
W =
@
@W = PQ
0 (h (:)L)LhW (:)  L
Z =
@
@Z =  1
P =
@
@P = Q (h (:)L
) > 0
U =
@
@U = PQ
0 (h (:)L)LhU (:) > 0
T =
@
@T =  1
Y = W = 0
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
     (A5)
Partially di¤erentiating di¤erent expressions in (A.5) we nd the following expressions.
WW =
@2
@W 2
= PQ0 [LhWW + LWhW ] + PL
hWQ00 [LhW + LWh]  LW
WZ = 0
WP =
@2
@W@P = Q
0 [LhW + Lh]
WU =
@2
@W@U = PQ
0 [LhUW + LWhU ] + PL
hUQ00 [LhW + LWh]
WY = WT = WW = 0
ZZ = ZW = ZP = ZU = ZY = ZT = ZW = 0
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
   (A6)
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Note that "h;W =

@h(:)
@W
W
h(:)

> 0. Dene "L;W =

@h(:)
@W
W
h(:)

. From our previous ndings we have
"L;W . Now, from (A6) we have the following:
WP =

Q0 (:)h (:)L
W

["h;W + "L;W ] < (=) > 0
i¤ "h;W < (=) > j"L;W j
Besides, partially di¤erentiating the expressions for YW and YZ , as presented in (8), we nd
YWW =
@2Y
@W 2
=  p00 (W ) (W + Z  W )  2p0 (W ) > 0
YZW =  p0 (W ) > 0
YWP = YWY = YWU = YWT = 0
YWW = p
0 (:) < 0
YZW =  p00 (:) > 0
YZZ = YZP = YZY = YZU = YZT = YZW = 0
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
   (A7)
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Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 1 Using (6) and (8) from equations (2) and (12) it can computed that
[PQ0(:)hW (:) 1]L
 1 =
h
1 p0(W+Z W ) p(:)
1 p(:)
i
=) [PQ0 (:)hW (:)  1]L =  
h
1 p0(W+Z W ) p(:)
1 p(:)
i
< 0
9=;   (A8)
The L.H.S. of (A8) is equal to W (see the previous appendix). This implies W < 0.
Note that "h;W =
@h(:)
@W
W
h(:) = hW
W
h(:) .
From (2) we get PQ0 (:) = Wh(:) . This means "h;W = hWPQ
0 (:). From (A8) it now follows that
PQ0 (:)hW (:)  1 < 0
The above implies that "h;W < 1. This completes proof of proposition 1.
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Proofs of Propositions 2, 3 and 4 Totally di¤erentiating equations (9) and (10) we obtain
the following two expressions.
BWWdW +BWZdz =  
 
BWPdP +BWY dY +BWUdU +BWTdT +BWWdW
     (A9)
BZWdW +BZZdz =  
 
BZPdP +BZY dY +BZUdU +BZTdT
     (A10)
where
BWW = 2WYW +YWW + (Y   Y )WW < 0 (follows from (11))
BWZ = ZYW +YWZ + YZW > 0 (since  is su¢ ciently high)
BZZ = 2ZYZ < 0
BWP = PYW + (Y   Y )WP > 0
BWY =  W > 0
BWU = UYW + (Y   Y )WU > 0
0BBB@
since YW > 0; U > 0 and
U is su¢ ciently high as P is su¢ ciently high
and (Y   Y ) is su¢ ciently low
1CCCA
BWT =  YW < 0 (note that T =  1)
BWW = WYW +YWW + (Y   Y )WW < 0
BZP = PYZ > 0
BZY =  Z > 0
BZU = UYZ > 0
BZT =  YZ < 0
BZW = WYZ +YZW + (Y   Y )ZW = 0
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
   (A11)
It should be pointed out that in order to nd out the signs of the above expressions we have
used (A.5) (A.7). Before proceeding further we substitute W  and Z for W and Z, respectively
which are obtained by solving equations (9) and (10) simultaneously.
We now write equations (A.9) and (A.10) in the following matrix form. BWW BWZBZW BZZ

 dW

dZ
 =  
 BWPdP +BWY dY +BWUdU +BWTdT +BWWdWBZPdP +BZY dY +BZUdU +BZTdT
   (A12)
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E¤ects on W  Solving (A12) for dW  we get
dW  =   1
D
 BWPdP +BWY dY +BWUdU +BWTdT +BWWdW BWZBZPdP +BZY dY +BZUdU +BZTdT BZZ
   (A13)
With the help of (A.11) from (A.13) the following results easily follow.
dW 
dP =   1D [BWPBZZ  BWZBZP ] > 0
dW 
dY =   1D

BWYBZZ  BWZBZY

> 0
dW 
dU =   1D [BWUBZZ  BWZBZU ] > 0
dW 
dT =   1D [BWTBZZ  BWZBZT ] < 0
dW 
dW =   1D

BWWBZZ

< 0
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
   (A14)
The results in (A.14) have been verbally stated in proposition 2.
E¤ects on L For nding out the consequences of any policy changes on the equilibrium level of
employment, L, we consider equation (4) where we nd that the net e¤ect consists of both direct
e¤ects and indirect e¤ects through changes in equilibrium level of wage, W .
Totally di¤erentiating equation (4) and using (A.14) we can derive the following results.
dL
dP =
@L
@P +
@L
@W
dW
dP =?
dL
dY =
@L
@Y +
@L
@W
dW
dY < 0
dL
dU =
@L
@U +
@L
@W
dW
dU < 0
dL
dT =
@L
@T +
@L
@W
dW
dT > 0
dL
dW =
@L
@W +
@L
@W
dW
dW > 0
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
   (A15)
Proposition 3 describes the results as presented in (A.15).
E¤ects on Z Finally, solving (A.12) for dZ we nd
dZ =   1
D
 BWW BWPdP +BWY dY +BWUdU +BWTdT +BWWdWBZW BZPdP +BZY dY +BZUdU +BZTdT
   (A16)
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With the help of (A.11) from (A.16) the following results readily follow.
dZ
dP =   1D [BWWBZP  BZWBWP ] > 0
dZ
dY =   1D

BWWBZY  BZWBWY

> 0
dZ
dP =   1D [BWWBZU  BZWBWU ] > 0
dZ
dT =   1D [BWWBZT  BZWBWT ] < 0
dZ
dW =
1
D

BZWBWW

9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
   (A17)
The results presented in (A.17) are verbally stated in terms of proposition 4.
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